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IMMIGRATION LAW 
I. ELIGIBILITY FOR LABOR CERTIFICATION: 
REQUISITE INTENT TO ENGAGE IN THE 
CERTIFIED EMPLOYMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Yui Sing Tse v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, I 
the Ninth Circuit considered the issue of how long an alien must 
intend, at time of entry, to engage in the employment for which 
he was certified in order to qualify for a labor category immigrant 
visa. 
Petitioner was admitted to the United States on a student 
visa in January, 1971. In March, 1973, the Department of Labor 
issued petitioner an alien employment certification pursuant to 
section 1182(a)(14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
Act) authorizing petitioner's employment as a Chinese specialty 
cook.2 Petitioner then applied for adjustment of status under sec-
tion 12553 of the Act claiming entitlement to a "sixth preference" 
1. 596 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. Mar., 1979) (per Browning, J.; the other panel members were 
Wallace, J. and Waters, D.J.) (Judge Wallace dissented and filed an opinion). 
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1978) provides that aliens seeking to enter the United 
States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor are ineligible to receive visas 
and are excludable 
unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to 
the Secretary of State and to the Attorney General that (A) 
there are not sufficient workers in the United States who are 
able, willing, qualified, and available at the time of application 
for a visa and admission to the United States ... and (B) the 
employment of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages 
and working conditions of the workers in the United States 
similarly employed . . . . 
The visa represents permission to enter and stay in the United States. The labor certifica-
tion, on the other hand, is a preliminary requirement for the issuance of certain visas. It 
is generally required of visa applicants whose primary purpose is the performance of labor 
and who do not qualify for immigration on the basis of relatives in the United States. See 
generally 1 C. GORDON AND H. ROSENFELD, IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE §§ 2.40, 3.6 
(1978). 
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1978) provides in relevant part: 
The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or pa-
roled into the United States may be adjusted by the Attorney 
General, in his discretion and under such regulation as he may 
proscribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such adjust-
ment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and 
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visa under section 1153(a)(6).4 
Petitioner's application for adjustment of status was denied 
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service instituted de-
portation proceedings. In the course of these proceedings peti-
tioner requested reconsideration of his application for adjustment 
of status. At a hearing held in July, 1975, petitioner disclosed that 
he had been accepted for admission to dental school. He testified 
that it would require four years to complete his dental education, 
and that he intended to continue working as a Chinese specialty 
cook to support himself while attending school. 5 
The immigration judge denied petitioner's application and 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The BIA 
looked to whether, at the moment of entry, the alien intended to 
change from the certified employment. On the basis of this stan-
dard, the BIA concluded that as a matter of law petitioner was 
ineligible for the preference status since his intent was not to 
continue as a cook, but rather to become a dentist.6 On appeal 
the Ninth Circuit rejected the BIA standard, reversed and re-
manded the case. 
(3) immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time 
his application is filed. 
In essence, adjustment of status is a procedure whereby an alien, already present in the 
United States in a temporary or irregular status, may apply for a permanent residence 
visa while remaining in the country. Before enactment of § 1255 the alien had to leave 
the United States, obtain the visa abroad, and return. See generally 2 C. GORDON AND H. 
ROSENFELD, supra note 2, at § 7.7. Although the applicant for adjustment of status is 
already in the United States, he will be regarded as an alien seeking entry for purposes of 
determining his eligibility for the permanent residence visa. Hamid v. Immigration & Nat. 
Serv., 538 F.2d 1389,1390 (9th Cir. 1976); Talanoa v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 397 F.2d 
196, 200 (9th Cir. 1976). 
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6) (1978) provides that visas will be provided to otherwise 
qualified persons "who are capable of performing specified skilled or unskilled labor, not 
of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which a shortage of employable and willing persons 
exist in the United States. . . ." 
There are seven preference categories which allot a limited number of immigrant 
(permanent resident) visas to aliens seeking entry to the United States. For a discussion 
of the preference system see generally 1 C. GORDON AND H. RoSENFEW, supra note 2, at 
§§ 2.25-.28. 
5. 596 F.2d at 833. 
6. The BIA did not consider the ground on which the immigration judge based his 
decision. The immigration judge found petitioner ineligible since, at the time of peti-
tioner's request for reconsideration of his application, he was employed by a different 
employer than the one designated on the labor certificate. The Ninth Circuit declined to 
consider this issue since the BIA did not rely on it. [d. at 833 n.3. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
Section 1153(a)(6) of the Act provides a limited number of 
"sixth preference" visas to aliens seeking permanent residence in 
the United States.7 In order to be eligible, the applicant must be 
qualified to perform services which are not of a seasonal or tempo-
rary natureS and for which there exists a shortage of employable 
workers in this country. As a condition to eligibility for the "sixth 
preference" visa, the alien must apply for and receive a certifica-
tion from the Department of Labor acknowledging that the labor 
which the alien intends to perform will not displace American 
workers or advesely affect their wages or working conditions.u 
The Federal Regulations require the invalidation of any visa 
application where there is found any "change in the respective 
intentions of the prospective employer and the beneficiary (the 
alien) that the beneficiary will be employed by the employer in 
the capacity indicated in the supporting job offer."10 Nothing in 
the language of the regulations, however, expressly indicates the 
length of time the alien must intend to occupy the position for 
which he was certified. 
C. THE NEW BALANCING STANDARD 
The specific question presented to the court m Tse was 
7. For the relevant statutory language, see note 4 supra. 
8. Few decisions have definitively spoken to the question of what is or is not tempo-
rary or seasonal work. The BIA has considered two factors: 1) whether the nature of the 
work itself is permanent, Matter of Smith, 12 1. & N. Dec. 772 (1968) (employment by a 
firm which provides temporary office personnel to other companies not temporary since 
employing firm pays workers directly and employment was full-time and permanent); cf. 
Matter of Contopoulos, 101. & N. Dec. 654 (1964) (employment as a "governess, mother's 
helper" permanent since duties last as long as family unit exists); Matter of L-, 8 1. & 
N. Dec. 460 (1960) (position of intern at hospital found permanent); and 2) whether the 
employer intends to employ the alien permanently, Matter of lzdebska, 121. & N. Dec. 
54 (1964) (employment temporary since in light of past practice, the employer failed to 
prove his intent to employ the alien permanently). 
9. In discharging his responsibilities the Secretary of Labor has established two 
"schedules" listing occupations for which individual determinations need not be made. 
The first, "Schedule A," is a blanket determination that the entry of an alien in the 
occupations it enumerates will not adversely affect the American labor market. The sec-
ond, "Schedule B," is a non certification list or the blanket determination that there is an 
ample supply of American workers to fill the occupations it enumerates. Certification of 
jobs not listed on either schedule is made on an individual basis. For a discussion of the 
certification procedure see generally 1A C. GORDON AND H. ROSENFELD, supra note 2, at § 
3.6. 
10. 8 C.F.R. § 204.4(b) (1979). 
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whether or not the BIA applied the appropriate legal standard in 
determining petitioner's eligibility for a "sixth preference" visa. 
The Majority 
The majority first addressed two interests it deemed worthy 
of protection in considering the appropriate standard to apply, 
the first being the protection of American labor.lI According to 
the court, the "sixth preference" visa was designed to permit the 
entry of aliens capable of performing labor for which American 
workers were not available. The labor certification attempts to 
assure the protection of American workers from the competition 
of aliens who might otherwise take jobs Americans could fill. It 
The majority next considered what it found to be a "second 
and potentially conflicting interest of an alien granted permanent 
resident status in the opportunity to earn a living"13 and to im-
prove his economic circumstances without undue limitation or 
discrimination. The court felt that undue restriction on a perma-
nent resident's freedom to change occupations could raise serious 
constitutional problems. U 
The standard applied by the BIA was then examined in the 
context of the two "protected interests". The BIA stan-
dard-which in effect requires the applicant to intend to occupy 
the certified position indefinitely-was found to be too narrow 
and rigid to accommodate the interests to be protected. The court 
held that "sixth preference" applicants need not intend to occupy 
the certified employment forever, but only for a "period of time 
that is reasonable in light both of the interest served by the stat-
ute and the interest in freedom to change employment."15 Thus, 
11. 596 F.2d at 834. 
12. [d. It is clear that the purpose of the labor certification is to exclude aliens who 
could otherwise compete for jobs American workers could fill. See S. REp. No. 748, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 3328, 3333. 
13. 596 F.2d at 834. 
14. As authority for the "second interest" the court cited 1 & 1A C. GORDON AND H. 
ROSENFELD, supra note 2, at §§ 1.34, 3.6g; 29 C.F.R. § 60.5(0 (1976), and Castaneda· 
Gonzalez V. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 564 F.2d 417, 433 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1977). As the 
dissent points out, all of the above authority refers only to a permanent resident's right 
to pursue employment. There is no indication that the rights of resident aliens extend as 
well to aliens of another status. In fact, th~ section of C. GORDON AND H. RoSENFELD cited 
in the majority opinion expressly states that illegal and nonimmigrant (i. e., non· 
permanent resident) aliens have no right to work in this country. See C. GORDON AND H. 
ROSENFELD supra note 2, at § 1.34A. 
15. 596 F.2d at 835. 
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the court concluded that application of this standard to the facts 
of the case indicated that petitioner's intent to occupy the certi-
fied employment for a period of four years (while attending dental 
school) and to change employment only upon a condition that 
might not be satisfied (successful completion of dental school), 
was entirely reasonable in light of the interests to be protected. lfl 
After examining the relevant statutory sections and regula-
tion, which the court found not to be supportive of the BIA's 
position, 17 the court considered the two cases cited by the BIA as 
authority for its standard, and found both decisions distinguish-
able on their facts. IS 
As a result of its new balancing standard, the majority thus 
concluded that petitioner was eligible for adjustment of status. A 
petition for adjustment of status, however, calls for two determi-
nations: whether the applicant is eligible for relief; and, if so, 
whether relief should be granted as a matter of discretion. Since 
the second determination was never made, the majority re-
manded the case for further proceedings. IS 
The Dissent 
Judge Wallace focused his dissent on the analytical founda-
tion of the majority opinion, the two "protected interests." Al-
though agreeing that the policy behind the grant of "sixth prefer-
ence" status was the protection of American labor, he found the 
majority far astray in its attempt to apply the "second and poten-
16. [d. 
17. [d. The majority pointed out that the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) does not 
bear on the length of commitment required. Likewise, 8 C.F.R. § 204.4(b), on its face, only 
requires that applicants intend to be employed in the job, not that they intend to remain 
in the job forever. The court also found that 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6) which limits "sixth 
preference" visas to persons capable of performing labor "not of a temporary or seasonal 
nature" was not dispositive since the reference is only to the nature of the employment 
itself, not to the intent of the applicant. 
It is interesting to note that in determining the temporary or permanent nature of 
employment the BIA has looked to the intent of the employer. See note 8 supra. If the 
intent of the employer is relevant to the determination of the nature of the employment, 
it is unclear why the intent of the applicant would be any less relevant. 
18. 596 F.2d at 835. The court found that the petitioner in Matter of La Pietra, 13 I. 
& N. Dec. 11 (1964), did not possess the skills on which the certification was based. 
Likewise, Matter of Kim, 13 I. & N. Dec. 16 (1968) was distinguishable in that the 
petitioner never occupied the certified position and had no intention of doing so at any 
time in the future. 
19. 596 F.2d at 835-36. 
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tially conflicting interest. "20 
The dissent first attacked the scant authority relied upon for 
that second interest. All of the majority's authority reciting the 
principle of "freedom to work" referred only to the rights of pro-
perly admitted permanent residents, not to aliens seeking admis-
sion.21 
The dissent also found the majority misleading in its ap-
proach to the issue and its understanding of the BIA standard. 
The dissent stated that the issue was not whether an alien, once 
properly admitted for permanent residence, may change jobs. 
Rather, "the question is whether an alien who applies for immi-
grant status . . . may definitively intend, at the time that he 
makes his application, to change employment from that for which 
he acquired his labor certificate."22 
The BIA did not forbid an immigrant alien from improving 
his employment situation, the dissent pointed out. The BIA sim-
ply held that when the petitioning alien submits his application 
he must have made the choice to work in the area for which he 
received the work certificate. The dissent concluded that when 
the petitioner admitted that his desire to work in the certified 
employment was merely temporary, i.e., until he became a den-
tist, he should not qualify. 23 
The dissent found the BIA principle illustrated in Matter of 
Poulin.24 In Poulin, the alien worked in the certified employment 
for only one day after which he began working in uncertified 
employment. At the exclusion hearing, the alien admitted that he 
intended, at time of entry, to work in the certified position only 
until his papers were finalized. The BIA upheld the alien's exclu-
sion on the grounds that he "actually intended" to work in the 
uncertified job. The dissent found the underlying principle of 
20. ld. at 836. 
21. ld. The dissent also pointed out that 29 C.F.R. § 60.5(f) (1976), relied upon by 
the majority for the "second interest," had been repealed. The regulation provided in 
relevant part that "the terms and conditions of the labor certificate shall not be construed 
as preventing an immigrant properly admitted to the United States from subsequently 
changing jobs .... " The new regulations do not contain comparable language. See 20 
C.F.R. § 656 (1979). 
22. 596 F.2d at 837. 
23. Id. 
24. 13 I. & N. Dec. 264 (1968). 
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Poulin equally applicable to the facts in Tse. Although the peti-
tioner in Tse intended to work for four years rather than one day, 
in both cases the intent was, for the foreseeable future, not to 
work in the certified job, but to work in that job only until another 
uncertified job became available. 25 The dissent concluded that 
the majority's holding would only frustrate the statutory man-
date of protecting American labor. 26 
D. CRITIQUE 
As pointed out by the dissent, the primary weakness of the 
majority decision lies in the "second interest," the probable con-
stitutional right of permanent residents to earn a livelihood. It is 
not clear from the majority's reasoning which alien status is 
vested of this right. Did the court understand the right to belong 
solely to aliens properly admitted for permanent residence?27 Or 
did the majority view the right to earn a living as equally applica-
ble to petitioner, an alien seeking admission to the United 
States?28 
If the majority found the "second interest" solely in a perma-
nent resident's right to earn a livelihood, it did not est~blish how 
the BIA standard failed to accommodate a permanent resident's 
right. It would appear that the majority misunderstood the BIA 
standard which only holds that an alien seeking admission to the 
United States for the purpose of performing labor must intend, 
at time of entry, to indefinitely occupy the certified position. The 
BIA has never held that an alien once admitted for permanent 
residence must occupy the certified employment forever. Once 
25. 596 F.2d at 837. 
26. [d. 
27. The majority framed the "second interest" solely in terms of permanent resident's 
rights. "The second and potentially conflicting interest of an alien granted permanent 
residence status is the opportunity to earn a living .... " [d. at 834 (emphasis added). 
There is no express indication in the body of the majority decision of its intention to 
extend this "right" to aliens seeking admission. 
28. That the majority intended to extend the right to earn a livelihood to non-resident 
aliens may be evidenced by its discussion of the decision of the immigration judge in 
footnote 3 of the majority opinion. The immigration judge denied petitioner's application 
on the ground that petitioner, at that time a non-immigrant student, had changed from 
the job for which he had been certified. The majority approved the BIA's failure to rely 
on this ground. "Board rulings in analogous circumstances cast doubt upon the validity 
of the immigration judge's ruling .... " [d. at 833 n.3 (emphasis added). The two 
rulings referred to by the court, however, dealt solely with the permanent resident's 
freedom to change occupations. See Matter of Cardoso, 131. & N. Dec. 228 (1969); Matter 
of Klein, 12 1. & N. Dec. 819 (1968). 
7
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properly admitted, a permanent resident is free to change his 
mind and seek different employment.29 
On the other hand, if a permanent resident's right to work 
was intended by the court to apply, by analogy, to aliens seeking 
admission, the court is embarking upon a novel and unprece-
dented territory. It is well established that aliens have no consti-
tutional right to enter the United States.so In this light, it seems 
incongruous to imply that an alien seeking admission, who has no 
right even to enter this country, would have a constitutionally 
protected right to work here.31 
E. CONCLUSION 
The significance of Tse rests more on its ambiguous reason-
ing than on its holding. Whether Tse represents the Ninth Cir-
cuit's misunderstanding of the BIA standard, its confusion of the 
rights of permanent residents with those of aliens seeking admis-
sion, or the court's willingness to extend the constitutional right 
to work to aliens seeking admission, remains to be seen. 
Whatever may be the underlying reason for the court's stand 
in Tse, it is unlikely that the ruling will have a substantial dele-
terious impact on American labor. The number of aliens entering 
the United States on the basis of labor certifications is insignifi-
cant compared to the numbers in the American workforce.32 In 
29. Matter of Cardoso, 13 I. & N. Dec. 228 (1969) (alien's post-entry failure to con-
tinue in the certified employment may give rise to a suspicion that he never intended to 
fulfill his employment contract; however, if the alien has been admitted for permanent 
residence with the. good faith intention of occupying the job, he is free to pursue other 
employment); Matter of Marcoux, 12 I. & N. Dec. 827 (1968) (permanent resident may 
leave certified job after short time because of dissatisfaction with working conditions or 
wages); Matter of Klein, 12 I. & N. Dec. 819 (1968) (permanent resident not deportable 
simply because the certified job was no longer available). 
30. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the power of Congress to determine 
which aliens may enter the United States is plenary and unqualified. Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
31. Only one court has faced the issue extending the constitutional right to work to 
aliens other than permanent residents. In Pilapil v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 424 F.2d 6 
(lOth Cir. 1970), the Tenth Circuit discussed the constitutional status of an alien seeking 
admission and concluded that an alien seeking admission has "no rights under the Consti-
tution, laws or government of the United States. As a citizen and national of another 
country his rights were established by the alien law peculiar to his native domicile. . . . 
Therefore, no rights under the Constitution. . . relative to equal opportunity of employ-
ment are involved." [d. at 11. 
32. In 1975, 15,087 "third" and "sixth preference" aliens were admitted for perm a-
8
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tum, the court's ruling affects only a small percentage of those 
aliens, those who admit by words or acts their intention to change 
from the certified employment. Moreover, the court's standard, 
in terms of the "first interest," recognizes the statutory duty to 
protect American labor. It is doubtful that the court, in future 
cases, will substantially frustrate the purpose for the labor certifi-
cation. 
Nevertheless, the court leaves us to merely speculate as to 
the possible results of future application of its new standard. 
Which of the two factors (Le., length of commitment or uncer-
tainty of change) will be the most dispositive in future 
considerations? Would a commitment to work in the certified job 
for two years and to change only upon the fulfillment of an uncer-
tain condition be reasonable? Would a longer commitment be 
reasonable if the change were certain to occur? And will the court 
consider other factors, such as the nature of the future 
employment? If the future employment is presently one for which 
certifications are available, will the balance more likely tip in 
favor of the alien? 
The implications of the new standard are certainly vague but 
will hopefully be clarified in later decisions. In the meantime the 
practitioner should be cautious of relying on Tse. Its ambiguous 
reasoning is conducive to several interpretations and it is easily 
distinguishable on its facts. At this point, it is only clear that the 
intent to work in certified employment for four years and to 
change from that employment only upon a condition that may 
not be satisfied (successful completion of dental school) will be 
deemed reasonable by this court. 
. Alex Schmid 
ll. SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION: A NEW APPROACH 
TO THE CONTINUOUS PHYSICAL PRESENCE 
REQUIREMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Kamheangpatiyooth u. Immigration and Naturalization 
nent residence. (1976) INS ANN. REP. 45 (1976). The total number of persons in the 
American civilian lab~r force for that year was 92,613,000. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 9 (Sept. 1979). 
9
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Service, I the Ninth Circuit re-examined the standard applied to 
determine the "continuous physical presence" requirement for 
eligibility for suspension of deportation relief. 
Petitioner was legally admitted to the United States as a 
student in 1964. In 1970, petitioner returned to Thailand during 
a semester vacation to visit his mother who was gravely ill. He 
left the United States on December 10, 1970, and returned on 
January 10, 1971. Before :leaving on his trip, petitioner obtained 
an Immigration Form 1-20N which he used in Bangkok to obtain 
a new student visa. This thirty-day visit to his mother was peti-
tioner's only absence from the United States during the twelve-
year period from his initial entry in 1964 until his application for 
suspension of deportation in 1976.3 
Petitioner's authorization to remain in this country expired 
on January 23, 1976. When he did not depart, the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated deportation proceed-
ings. Petitioner admitted deportability but applied for suspen-
sion of deportation relief. 4 In evaluating whether petitioner's 
thirty-day absence would adversely affect his eligibility for the 
relief, the immigration judge purported to apply the test of 
Rosenburg v. Fleuti.~ The "Fleuti test", the judge found, is 
"three-pronged: the length of the visit, the purposes thereof, and 
whether the alien had to receive any travel documents to make 
the trip."6 The immigration judge then noted that petitioner trav-
elled several thousand miles, was absent for one month, secured 
an I-20A form before departure, carried a Thai passport, and 
obtained a new student visa while abroad. Finding that the Fleuti 
prerequisites had not been met, the judge concluded that peti-
tioner's one month absence rendered him ineligible for suspension 
of deportation relief.7 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
summarily affirmed the decision.8 
1. 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. May, 1979)(per Browning, J.; the other panel members 
were Anderson, J. and Waters, D.J.). 
2. Form I-20A is a certificate completed by an approved school attesting that the 
alien has been accepted by the school and will pursue a full course of studies. It is a 
prerequisite for non-immigrant student visas. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (f) (1978). 
3. 597 F.2d at 1255. 
4. For discussion of suspension of deportation relief see text accompanying notes 11 
to 21 infra. 
5. 374 U.S. 449 (1963). 
6. 597 F.2d at 1257. 
7.Id. 
8. Thf BIA affirmed the immigration judge's decision per curiam citing two cases: 
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On petition for review, the Ninth Circuit held that the immi-
gration judge and the BIA had based their determinations upon 
an erroneous legal standard. The three factors, the court ex-
plained, should not be the object of the inquiry. The factors are 
merely evidence of the central question of whether an "absence 
reduced the significance of the whole seven year period as reflec-
tive of hardship and unexpectedness of exposure to expulsion."9 
Since the immigration judge and the BIA failed to evaluate peti-
tioner's application in the proper manner, the Ninth Circuit va-
cated and remanded the case. IO 
B. BACKGROUND: SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION AND THE 
CONTINUOUS PRESENCE CLAUSE 
Deportation is often considered a harsh and cruel punish-
ment. \I This is particularly true where the alien has lived in this 
country for a considerable period of time and has established 
significant ties to this society. Recognizing the harshness of de-
portation, Congress developed measures for relief. '2 One such 
measure is suspension of deportation. '3 The Immigration and 
Nationality Act14 provides that the Attorney General may, at his 
discretion, suspend the deportation and adjust the statusl5 to that 
Munor-Casarez v. Immiiration & Nat. Serv., 511 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1975) and In re Janati-
Ataie, 14 I. & N. Dec. 216, 221 (Atty. Gen. 1972). In Munoz-Casarez, petitioner's 30-day 
visit to an iII sister in Mexico was found to be "meaningfully interruptive" of his residence 
ven though petitioner never intended to abandon his residence. The Ninth Circuit noted 
that the trip involved an absence of 30 days, was knowing and purposeful, and involved 
travelling approximately 1,000 miles. In Janati-Ataie, the Attorney General found peti-
tioner's two visits (one of 30 days, the other of 35 days) to his parents in Iran "meaningfully 
interruptive" despite petitioner's intent not to abandon his residence and his substantial 
ties to this country. The decision focused upon the duration of the absences, the procure-
ment of travel documents, and the distance travelled. 
Later in its opinion, the court, in a footnote, distinguished Munoz-Casarez and in part 
disapproved Janati-Ataie. 597 F.2d at 1259 n.7. See note 38 supra. 
9. 597 F.2d at 1259 (emphasis added). 
10. Id. at 1260. 
11. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)("deportation is a drastic measure 
and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile"). 
12. The principle relief provisions are: 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (e) (1976)(voluntary depar-
ture); id. § 1251 (f)(waiver of deportation for aliens with family ties who obtained entry 
by fraud); id. § 1259 ("registry" which grants permanent residence to certain aliens who 
have resided in the United States since 1948); id. § 1253 (h)(withholding deportation to 
any country where alien would be subject to persecution); id. § 1255 (adjustment of 
status). See generally Mitgang, Alternatives to Deportation: Relief Provisions of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 323 (1975). 
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976). 
14. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976). 
15. Adjustment of status, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976), is a procedure which permits an 
alien, already present in the United States in a temporary or irregular status, to apply 
11
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of a permanent resident of any alien who has been "physically 
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less 
than seven years, . . . is a person of good moral character . . . 
and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the 
Attorney General, result in extreme hardship .... "16 
Interpretation of the continuous physical presence clause has 
been difficult for the courts. The clause involves two factors: 
physical presence and continuity. Although as a factual matter 
physical presence is easily determined,17 the determination of 
whether a particular departure should be construed as interrup-
tive of an alien's continuous presence in the United States has 
been more troublesome. The fact that an alien has taken a brief 
trip abroad often bears little rational relation to the ties he has 
developed in this country or to the probability that his deporta-
tion would cause extreme hardship. 
In Wadman v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,18 the 
Ninth Circuit faced the construction of the term "continuous" for 
the first time. In that case the INS argued that petitioner's five 
day trip to Mexico interrupted the continuity of his physical pres-
ence even though petitioner had lived in the United States for 
over seven years. The court rejected the INS argument and held 
that petitioner's absence, when viewed in balance with its conse-
quences, was not meaningfully interruptive of the continuity of 
his presence. 19 
The Wadman approach was based upon the Supreme Court's 
ruling in Rosenburg v. Fleuti. 20 The standard announced in Fleuti 
for a permanent residence visa while remaining in the country. Before enactment of § 
1255, the alien had to leave the United States, obtain the visa abroad, and return. See 
generally 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE § 7.7 at 7-71 
to 7-117 (1979). 
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (a)(1)(1976)(emphasis added). 
17. Mere maintenance of residence in the United States is not sufficient. With certain 
exceptions for veterans, see 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (b), the alien must have been physically 
within the United States borders for the requisite period of time. 2 C. GORDON & H. 
ROSENFIELD, supra note 15, § 7.9d at 7-144 to 7-165. 
18. 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964). 
19. [d. at 816. 
20. 374 U.S. 449 (1963). The Supreme Court in Fleuti did not deal with the meaning 
of "continuous presence" for purposes of suspension of deportation relief but rather with 
the meaning of "entry" for purposes of the exclusion and deportation statutes. The Act 
defines entry as "any coming of an alien into the United States ... except that an alien 
having a lawful permanent. residence in the United States shall not be regarded as making 
an entry ... if ... his departure ... was not intended ... or was not voluntary." 8 
U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(13) (1976). The precise definition of "entry" is especially important to 
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was whether the alien's departure was intended to be 
"meaningfully interruptive" of the alien's residence. The Court 
explained that to determine meaningful interruption, factors 
such as the length of time of the absence, its purpose, and pro-
cruement of travel documents would be relevant. The Court also 
indicated that there may exist "other possible relevant factors."21 
C. THE COURT'S REASONING 
The Ninth Circuit first reviewed the general nature and pur-
pose of the suspension of deportation provision of the Act. 22 Reaf-
firming that the principles of Fleuti apply to the provisions of 
suspension of deportation relief, the court decided that the sec-
tion should not be read literally. Because suspension of deporta-
tion is a remedial measure, the court concluded that it must be 
interpreted generously in light of congressional intent. That in-
tent, found the court, was to "relieve aliens of the harsh results, 
and the unsuspected risks and unintended consequences, that 
the administration of the exclusion laws since at "entry" aliens are subject to the strict 
mandates of the immigration laws regarding admissibility. See generally C. GORDON & H. 
RoSENFELD, supra note 15, § 2.32 at 2-251 to 2-254. 
The "re-entry doctrine," provides that an alien's return following a temporary ab-
sence abroad will be deemed a new entry for purposes of the immigration laws. Volpe v. 
Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 425 (1933). As a result, a long-time permanent resident who leaves 
the country is subject to the strict entry requirements each and every time a "new entry" 
is made. Because the admission laws are often more encompassing or more difficult to 
satisfy than the deportation laws (compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (grounds for exclusion) with 
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (grounds for deportation)), the resident alien returning from a trip 
abroad may be excluded or deported even though he could not have been had he remained 
in the country. The irrationality of predicating an alien's right to remain here upon travel 
abroad led the Supreme Court to reconsider the literal interpretation of the entry defini-
tion in Fleuti. 
The Fleuti Court focused upon the intent exception to the Act's definition of entry. 
Reasoning that Congress intended to protect resident aliens from "unsuspected risks and 
unintended consequences of ... wholly innocent action," 374 U.S. at 462, the Court 
construed the exception to mean an intent to "meaningfully interrupt" the alien's resi-
dence. [d. 
Although Fleuti dealt with re-entry while Wadman involved "continuous presence," 
the Wadman court found the distinction "not ... at all significant." 329 F.2d at 815. In 
both areas, the inquiry focused on the circumstances under which an alien's absence 
should affect his deportability. [d. at 814. 
For a discussion of the history and impact of the "re-entry doctrine" see generally 
Gordon, When Does an Alien Enter the United States?, 9 FED. B.J. 248 (1948). For a 
critique of the doctrine see Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Laws: Proposals for 
Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 327 (1956); see also Herron, Exclusion and Deportation 
of Resident Aliens: The Re-entry Doctrine and the Need for Reform, 13 SAN. DIEGO L. REV. 
192 (1975). 
21. 374 U.S. at 462. 
22. The court also reviewed the purpose of the entry section of the Act as identified 
in Fleuti. See note 20 supra. 
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would flow from a literal and rigid application of the provisions 
of the Act relating to expulsion and exclusion."23 
The court then turned to the specific function of the continu-
ous physical presence requirement. According to the court, Con-
gress judged that seven years of physical presence would give rise 
to the likelihood of ties to this society sufficient to justify an 
examination by the Attorney General into whether deportation 
would be unduly harsh. The requirement of continuity was in-
cluded because it "is important to the legitimacy of the inference 
that extended presence is likely to make deportation harsh."24 
The court noted that frequent and long absences abroad suggest 
that the alien has not become attached to this society. Con-
versely, however, brief and infrequent absences would not dimin-
ish the probability of attachment. "An alien who leaves the coun-
try briefly. . . may be in no different position realistically viewed 
alien who has remained within the borders for an identical pe-
riod. "25 
To realize Congress' desire to avoid exposing aliens to unex-
pected risks of wholly innocent action, as identified by Fleuti,28 
and to realize the purpose of the "continuous period" require-
ment, the court held that the BIA must determine "whether a 
particular absence during the seven-year period reduced the sig-
nificance of the whole period as reflective of the hardship and 
unexpectedness of expulsion."27 As illustrative of this new stan-
dard the court explained that: 
An absence cannot be significant or meaningfully 
interruptive of the whole period if indications are 
that the hardship of deportation to the alien 
would be equally severe had the absence not oc-
curred, and that no significant increase in the li-
kelihood of deportation could reasonably have 
been expected to flow from the manner and cir-
cumstances surrounding the absence.28. 
The court found that the immigration judge and the BIA 
failed to evaluate petitioner's absence in this manner. Instead, 
23. 597 F.2d at 1256. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. at 1257. 
26. See note 20 supra. 
27. 597 F.2d at 1257 (emphasis added). 
28. [d. 
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the immigration judge focused solely on the three factors identi-
fied in Fleuti and proceeded to apply them as if they were them-
selves determinative of the meaning of the "continuous period" 
requirement. The court pointed out that these factors are not the 
object of inquiry, but merely evidentiary of the primary issue of 
whether the absence reduced the hardship or unexpectedness of 
expulsion.29 The court concluded that to treat the factors "as if 
they were in themselves the object of inquiry may defeat the 
objectives of the statute."30 
In light of the new standard, the court reviewed the facts of 
petitioner's thirty-day absence. The court noted two prior 
decisions which indicated that neither an absence of six31 nor 
sixteen months32 would, 'as a matter of law, conclusively interrupt 
the continuity of physical presence. Although petitioner was ab-
sent for thirty days and travelled several thousand miles, the 
court found that the trip was temporary by design,33 his only 
absence from the country, and limited in duration and distance 
by the exigencies that produced it.34 On balance, the court found 
that petitioner had significant ties to this country since he had 
been lawfully present in the United States for over twelve years 
and, during this period, had completed his education and pur-
sued his chosen profession. The court thus concluded that 
"[n]othing in the circumstances of petitioner's 30-day trip to 
Thailand detracts in any way from the inference, otherwise ap-
propriate from the length and nature of . . . his presence, that 
expulsion would be unexpected and would entail great hard-
ship. "35 
29. The court noted that the alien's purpose for the trip may have significance inde· 
pendent of its relevance in determining the importance of the absence in light of harshness 
and unexpectedness of deportation. Following the Fleuti interpretation, 374 U.S. at 642, 
the court held that if the purpose of the trip contravened some policy reflected in the 
immigration laws, the trip might be meaningfully interruptive. 597 F.2d at 1257-58 n.5. 
Considerable confusion has arisen in the application of the "purpose factor". See Herron, 
supra note 20, at 204. 
30. 597 F.2d at 1257-58. 
31. Toon·Ming Wong v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 363 F.2d 234,236 (9th Cir. 1966). 
32. McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960). However, McLeod, a pre.Fleuti 
case, was decided on estoppel principles since petitioner's absence was caused by the 
wrongful conduct of the INS. 
33. The trip was taken during a semester break. Petitioner left when classes ended 
and returned when they resumed. 597 F.2d at 1258. 
34. Petitioner went to Thailand to visit his mother who was gravely ill. Id. at 1255. 
35. [d. at 1258. 
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Similarly, the fact that petitioner secured travel documents 
was not dispositive. The court explained that procurement of 
documents is relevant in two ways: on the one hand, it may 
undermine the alien's continuous presence by showing the alien's 
awareness of the immigration consequences of his trip;38 on the 
other hand, it may confirm the continuity of his presence by 
showing his determination that the trip not affect his right to 
remain in this country. 37 Contrary to the holding of the immigra-
tion judge, the court found that the steps petitioner took to obtajn 
the documents and the nature of the documents he obtained con-
firmed the continuity of his presence since it demonstrated that 
he was "determined that his trip should not affect his status in 
this country. "38 
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, concluded that the only deter-
mination consistent with the statutory purpose was that peti-
tioner's absence did not break the continuity of his twelve-year 
physical presence. However, since the immigration judge and the 
BIA had based their contrary decisions upon an erroneous legal 
standard, the court properly remanded the case for a determina-
tion based upon the correct standard.3D 
D. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S STANDARD 
Before Kamheangpatiyooth, considerable confusion had ari-
sen in the judicial and administrative efforts to apply the Fleuti 
standard. 40 This standard, whether the alien's absence is 
36. The Fleuti court explained that procurement of travel documents was relevant 
because "the need to obtain such items might well cause the alien to consider more fully 
the implications involved in his leaving the country." 374 U.S. at 462. Presumably the 
alien's knowledge, in turn, would be relevant to the determination of unexpectedness of 
deportation. 
37. 597 F.2d at 1259. The court relied on Itzcovitz v. Selective Service, 447 F.2d 888 
(2d Cir. 1971). In that case the alien sought and obtained a declaratory judgement that 
an expected business trip to Israel would not affect his status. 
38. The court further noted that although petitioner in Kamheangpatiyooth, unlike 
ltzcovitz, did not seek a judicial determination before his trip, his procurement of return 
travel documents demonstrated with equal clarity his "determination" that the trip not 
affect his status. 597 F .2d at 1259. 
In a footnote to the discussion of travel documents, the court also discussed the two 
decisions relied on by the BIA. [d. at 1259 n. 7. The court distinguished Munoz-Casarez 
on the grounds that, unlike Kamheangpatiyooth, there was no "affirmative demonstra-
tion" of unexpectedness of deportation since it was not evident whether the alien in that 
case secured travel documents. The court disapproved in part Janati-Ataie, finding that 
the alien in that case did demonstrate adequate "pre-absence affirmative action." [d. 
39. [d. at 1259-60. 
40. For an excellent discussion of the post-Fleuti decisions see Herron, supra note 20, 
at 200-06. 
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"meaningfully interruptive" of his residence, is conclusionary 
and thus provides little guidance for rational determinations in 
specific situations. As a result, some decisions narrowly focused 
upon the factors suggested by the Supreme Court, treating the 
factors themselves as the test or standard of "meaningful inter-
ruption."41 Many decisions, on the other hand, developed and 
relied upon "other relevant factors."42 Lack of focus regarding 
what the "other factors" were relevant to, however, has led to 
disagreement over what factors should or should not be consid-
ered,43 
The Ninth Circuit's approach represents a significant depar-
ture from this past confusion. By defining "meaningful interrup-
tion" in terms of whether an absence reduces the hardship and 
unexpectedness of deportation, the court provides guidance for 
future determinations. By rejecting the rigid application of the 
Fleuti factors, the court redirects the determination to effectuate 
the remedial purpose of suspension of deportation relief. 
The decision may be subject to charges of judicial legislation 
since the Ninth Circuit appears to have taken abundant liberties 
with the otherwise clear and plain meaning of the term 
"continuous." Nevertheless, the court's "liberal construction" of 
the continuous presence clause seems justifiable since it is firmly 
grounded in the principles set forth by the Fleuti Court. This 
holding simply reflects an extension of prior judicial efforts to 
ameliorate the harsh consequences of literal application of our 
often out-datedH immigration laws. Moreover, the decision does 
not contravene Congress' overall purpose for the statute. As the 
41. See, e.g., Munoz-Casarez v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 511 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 
1975); In re Janati-Ataie, 141. & N. Dec. 216, 222-25 (Atty. Gen. 1972); In re Guimaraes, 
10 I. & N. Dec. 529 (1964). 
42. See, e.g., Heitland v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 551 F.2d 495, 502 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(illegality of original entry is a relevant factor); Lozano-Giron v. Immigration & Nat. 
Serv., 506 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 1974) (alien's ties to this country and nature of 
environment to which he would be deported is relevant); Toon-Ming Wong v. Immigration 
& Nat. Serv., 363 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1966) (petitioner's minority considered a factor); 
Zimmerman v. Lehmann, 339 F.2d 943, 949 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965) 
(subjective intent of alien not to abandon domicile is relevant). 
43. Compare Heitland v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 551 F.2d 495,502 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(illegality of original entry relevant), with Git Foo Wong v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 358 
F.2d'151, 153-54 (9th Cir. 1966) (illegality of original entry irrelevant); and compare 
Munoz-Casarez v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 511 F.2d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 1975) (subjective 
intent of alien not the test) with Zimmerman v. Lehmann, 339 F.2d 943, 949 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965) (subjective intent a relevant factor). 
44. See Gordon, The Need to Modernize Our Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1 (1975-1976); see also Maslow, supra note 20. 
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court explained, the new standard will not require the granting 
of relief in unmeritorious cases; once eligibility is determined, it 
is still up to the Attorney General to review the case and to decide 
whether, in his or her discretion, relief in fact would be war-
ranted. 45 
It is not clear from the decision how great a reduction in the 
harshness or unexpectedness of deportation an absence must 
cause before the court will find meaningful interruption. The de-
cision simply indicates that the reduction must be "significant."46 
Since the term is not precisely defined, it is difficult to predict 
how the court will rule in future cases where the facts differ signif-
icantly from those in Kamheangpatiyooth. 
Equally unclear from the decision is how the determination 
of "unexpectedness" will be made. During its discussion of the 
significance of securing travel documents, the court implied that 
deportation would be unexpected where the alien lacked aware-
ness that his departure could adversely affect his immigration 
status.47 However, the court also indicated that an alien's own 
determination that his trip not affect his status would show 
"unexpectedness."48 As a result it remains uncertain which defi-
nition the court will use in future applications of the standard. 
An alien may be "determined" to retain his status while at the 
same time fully "aware" of the immigration consequences of his 
departure. 
The Kamheangpatiyooth decision is an important case for 
the immigration practitioner. It greatly expands the boundary of 
permissible argument in suspension of deportation cases}9 No 
45. The statute emphasizes that the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend 
deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976). Consequently, even if the applicant meets the 
statutory requirements, he must still appeal to the discretion of the Attorney General, 
exercised through his delegates (ultimately the BIA). There are no published guidelines 
for the exercise of this discretion. See generally C. GORDON & H. RoSENFELD supra note 
15, § 7.ge at 7-165 to 7-170. If the Attorney General does not grant relief, the applicant 
must show an abuse of discretion. [d. § 8.15c at 8-99 to 8-105. 
46. 597 F.2d at 1259. 
47. See the court's discussion of the relevance of petitioner's procurement of travel 
documents. [d. at 1259; see also notes 36 to 38 supra and accompanying text. 
48. 597 F.2d at 1259. 
49. The present dEtcision may also be persuasive authority in cases involving the re-
entry doctrine. See note 20 supra. The court relied heavily upon Fleuti in developing its 
standard and reaffirmed that the principles of Fleuti used "in deciding whether an entry 
was intentional ... should also guide the determination of whether an intervening ab-
sence interrupts the continuity of physical presence . . ." 597 F .2d at 1256. 
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longer should the fulfillment of the three Fleuti factors be the sole 
or primary objects of the inquiry. The new standard invites all 
evidence relevant to the significance of the absence. As the stan-
dard suggests, particularly important will be the harshness and 
unexpectedness of deportation. Although even before 
Kamheangpatiyooth some courts considered harshness and unex-
pectedness as factors in their determinations,50 the new standard 
elevates these elements to the focus of the inquiry. In this light, 
the practitioner should concentrate his or her argument upon 
these two elements with the aim of showing that their significance 
was not meaningfully reduced by the alien's absence. One should 
emphasize such factors as the length of the alien's residence in 
relation to the brevity of his absence, the preservation of eco-
nomic and emotional ties to this society, the intent of the alien 
not to abandon his residence, and the alien's determination that 
his absence not affect his immigration status. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Like many legal standards, the Ninth Circuit's new ap-
proach does not provide a simple mathematical formula for pre-
dicting the results of its application to different fact situations. 
Future decisions, however, should serve to further delineate the 
specific parameters of the standard and thus alleviate much of 
the remaining confusion surrounding the continuous presence 
clause. For the alien applying for suspension of deportation relief, 
the new standard represents a step forward in the removal of an 
irrational barrier. Although the standard makes no guarantees 
that the alien's application will be approved, it increases the 
chances of consideration on the merits instead of dismissal based 
on an inflexible requirement. 
Alex Schmid 
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